The Boldness Australia Needs Has No Political Home Right Now

Key Points

• Regional Power Shift: Sam Roggeveen, director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program, delivers the 2024 Boyer Lecture titled Four Forces: Australia in the New Asia, arguing that the rise of China and the relative decline of US influence are fundamentally altering Asia’s geopolitical landscape.
• Material Dethroning of the West: Quoting economic historian Adam Tooze, Roggeveen highlights that China’s economic scale and manufacturing capacity represent a historic shift, making it the primary trading partner to approximately 120 nations.
• Limits of the US Alliance: Roggeveen contends that the United States no longer possesses a vital national interest in risking its security or military forces to defend allies in Asia against a power as substantial as China.
• Critique of AUKUS: The nuclear-powered submarine agreement is described as a reflection of Australia’s deep-seated reliance on American approval, with Roggeveen comparing US financial demands for shipyards to the mechanics of Las Vegas.
• Impossibility of Direct Strategic Alternatives: Regional heavyweights like Japan and India cannot serve as substitutes for the security umbrella historically provided by the US, necessitating a push toward greater Australian self-reliance.

Australian News Today (ANT) October 14, 2026 – In a speech examining the future of Australia’s foreign policy, Sam Roggeveen, director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program, delivered an edited extract of his Boyer Lecture titled Four Forces: Australia in the New Asia, warning that the country faces a transformative regional realignment requiring unprecedented strategic self-reliance.

What Are the Four Forces Reshaping Australia’s Strategic Landscape?

As outlined by Sam Roggeveen, director of the Lowy Institute’s International Security Program, during the annual Boyer Lecture series exploring Australia’s engagement with Asia in the 21st century, the region is experiencing the most dramatic transformation since World War II. Roggeveen noted that three primary structural shifts are under way: the gradual decline of one major empire, the rapid elevation of another, and the emergence of a formidable power directly within Australia’s immediate neighborhood.

Compounding these international developments, Roggeveen identified a fourth internal pressure: a distinct shift in the fundamental character of Western liberal democracies, including Australia’s own domestic political system. According to Roggeveen, these combined forces directly challenge Australia’s regional standing, identity, and political framework as a Western nation situated adjacent to an increasingly post-Western Asia.

Roggeveen explained that while Australia lacks the capacity to halt these overarching systemic shifts, the nation retains a fundamental choice regarding its response:

“We can’t stop these international forces, but we have a choice to make about how we meet the challenge, a choice about whether we leave our fate in the hands of others or take the harder road towards self-reliance.”

How Does China’s Economic and Military Rise Alter Global Power Dynamics?

Addressing China’s footprint, Roggeveen observed that China is already deeply embedded in the daily life of Australians as a major origin of immigration, international students, and consumer products, as well as Australia’s largest trading partner. Furthermore, China was widely credited with helping insulate Australia from recession during the Global Financial Crisis.

However, Roggeveen stressed that China’s regional presence is merely a component of its global impact. China serves as the single largest trading partner to roughly 120 nations, and approximately one-third of all physical goods manufactured worldwide originate within its borders. Roggeveen pointed out that depending on the economic metric applied, China’s economy is now at least four-fifths the size of the United States or potentially the largest globally.

Citing economic historian Adam Tooze, Roggeveen noted that China’s expansion represents “the material dethroning of the West as the central driver of world history.”

Roggeveen detailed how early expectations surrounding China’s integration into the international order failed to materialize. At the end of the Cold War, policy frameworks in Washington envisioned that a wealthier China would remain subordinate within a US-led Asian order, akin to post-war Germany or Japan—nations with significant economic capacity but restricted independent foreign policy ambitions.

Instead, Roggeveen pointed out that China is constructing the world’s largest navy, quadrupling its nuclear arsenal, deploying trade restrictions against US allies including Australia, and expanding its footprint through artificial island construction in the South China Sea. Roggeveen stated that China’s actions reflect standard great-power dynamics driven by scale rather than political ideology alone:

“We should assume China wants to lead in the region, and that means subordinating the US and its allies, and even pushing Washington out of Asia altogether. That’s not because China is communist or because it’s a dictatorship… this is a simple question of scale. China is big and big countries demand leadership.”

Why Is the US Position in Asia Declining Despite Its Overall Military Strength?

Diverging from mainstream Australian foreign policy consensus, Roggeveen challenged the core assumption that the US will continually guarantee Australia’s security against regional challenges.

While acknowledging that conventional Australian defense planning relies heavily on US security guarantees, Roggeveen argued that China’s rise has rendered Washington’s posture in Asia unsustainably weak. In earlier decades, US defense commitments across Asia carried minimal strategic risk because no regional actor possessed the capability to challenge American dominance. Today, fulfilling those same assurances would demand extraordinary sacrifices from the US.

Roggeveen cautioned against assuming that Washington would risk troop lives or expose US cities to potential nuclear conflict to defend allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, or Australia, arguing that the US lacks vital national interests sufficient to justify such extreme exposure.

Clarifying this distinction, Roggeveen emphasized that a weaker US military position in Asia does not equate to a weak American nation. The US retains the world’s largest economy, an expansive nuclear arsenal, a massive military budget, and physical isolation behind major oceans. Consequently, because the US is fundamentally secure within its own borders, maintaining leadership over Asia is non-essential to its immediate survival.

Roggeveen also highlighted that this power shift is independent of specific political leadership, such as former US President Donald Trump. While noting Trump’s controversial policy statements regarding international allies and territories, Roggeveen argued that structural realignments transcend individual presidencies:

“He has threatened to annex Greenland, make Canada the 51st state, and throw Ukraine under the bus. Still, it’s a mistake to focus on Trump because it invites us to believe that he was the cause of the power shift I am describing, and that things will return to something like ‘normal’ after he leaves the world stage. They won’t.”

Referencing foreign policy thinker Owen Harries’ 2003 Boyer Lecture And Then There Was One, which reflected on unipolar US dominance, Roggeveen noted that no past or future US president will enter a conflict with China that jeopardizes domestic American security over regional Asian leadership.

What Are the Strategic and Financial Criticisms of the AUKUS Agreement?

Turning to contemporary Australian defense strategy, Roggeveen criticized the AUKUS pact—initially announced by the Morrison government in 2021 and subsequently maintained by the Albanese government—which aims to acquire eight nuclear-powered submarines.

Roggeveen characterized AUKUS as a severe contradiction in Australian statecraft, noting that Australia committed to its largest-ever military alliance expansion precisely as the long-term reliability of US regional guarantees entered permanent decline.

Describing the alliance dynamics, Roggeveen argued that AUKUS reflects a persistent desire within Australian political culture to secure American approval, which US negotiators successfully capitalized on. Beyond the purchase costs, the arrangement requires Australia to invest billions of dollars directly into US shipbuilding infrastructure. Drawing a historical parallel, Roggeveen stated:

“In the 1930s, America built the gambling mecca of Las Vegas, an entire city in the desert dedicated to fleecing gamblers. If AUKUS demonstrates anything, it is that the Americans still have a talent for separating fools from their money.”

Roggeveen concluded that Australia must maintain strategic skepticism toward both a rising China and a retreating US, driving the nation toward greater individual defense capabilities.

Can Regional Powers Like Japan or India Replace the US Alliance?

Examining potential alternatives to the US strategic framework, Roggeveen argued that no single power can step into the role historically occupied by Washington.

Analyzing Japan, Roggeveen explained that regional geography and localized security demands prevent Tokyo from establishing a broad security umbrella across Asia. Japan remains heavily focused on immediate security threats near its own territory and lacks both the military capacity and regional ambition to project power into Australia’s immediate neighborhood.

Regarding India, Roggeveen recognized its economic trajectory and potential to eventually surpass the US in gross domestic product (GDP). However, geographic distance limits India’s utility as a direct defense partner for Australia. Roggeveen noted that it is unlikely a security crisis impacting Australia would ever trigger a direct defense response from New Delhi, and vice versa.

Despite these limitations, Roggeveen noted that one regional neighbor—possessing significant economic capacity and aligned vital interests—remains central to Australia’s strategic environment, even if it cannot fully replicate the security functions of the US alliance.

Background of the Particular Development

The Boyer Lectures, commissioned annually by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) since 1959, serve as a prominent national platform for leading thinkers to deliver addresses on major critical issues facing Australia. Over the decades, the series has featured influential figures in foreign policy, jurisprudence, and social sciences, providing a barometer for shifting intellectual and strategic debates within the country.

The security architecture of the Indo-Pacific has undergone substantial changes following the 2021 announcement of the AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Designed to provide Australia with conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capabilities and foster cooperation on advanced defensive technologies, AUKUS marked a significant deepening of trilateral defense integration. However, the deal has prompted ongoing domestic and international debate regarding its strategic cost, implementation timelines, sovereign control, and impact on regional diplomatic relationships across Asia.

Strategic Implications and Predictions

Impact on the Australian Public and Strategic Policy Community

If the structural realignments detailed by Sam Roggeveen continue on their current trajectory, the Australian public and political establishment face significant shifts in national defense priorities, economic commitments, and international posture:

• Increased Fiscal Burdens on Taxpayers: Moving toward true strategic self-reliance—or fulfilling the financial commitments associated with AUKUS and domestic defense industrial bases—will require sustained increases in federal defense expenditure. Taxpayers may see larger allocations of public revenue directed toward long-term defense procurement, potentially constraining budget availability for domestic social infrastructure and public services.
• Political Pressure for Bipartisan Realignment: As regional shifts challenge traditional defense assumptions, Australian political parties will face mounting pressure from security analysts and electors to articulate clear, long-term strategies for regional diplomatic engagement that do not rely solely on external alliance guarantees.
• Heightened Diplomatic Sensitivity in Asia: Australian trade, tourism, and higher education sectors—which remain heavily linked to markets across East and Southeast Asia—may experience ongoing friction if regional tensions escalate. Navigating diplomatic relationships with both major trade partners and regional neighbors will require consistent strategic clarity from Australian leadership.